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I. Introduction
There is a fundamental inconsistency in the current political fairness 
and access rules for U.S. broadcasting.  While political candidates enjoy a 
long-standing right of access to broadcast stations to express their views 
and attack and answer attacks from opponents, stations have no obligation 
to be fair to noncandidate citizens who may be personally attacked, nor to 
make any good-faith effort to present opposing views on controversial 
public issues.1  However, this has not always been the case.  Under the 
Fairness Doctrine, in place from 1949 to 1987, broadcasters were expected 
to present controversial issues of public importance and provide reasonable 
* Associate Professor, Director of Graduate Studies, Department of Communication, Pittsburg
State University, Pittsburg, Kansas marbuckle@pittstate.edu.
1. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 312(a)(7) (2012).
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opportunity for opposing views.2  Since the electromagnetic spectrum is a 
limited public resource, broadcasters using it must serve the public interest 
in exchange for the privilege of holding a license.3  Traditionally, this 
meant abiding by the candidate fairness rules as well as following general 
fairness expectations and rules with regard to noncandidate citizens and 
public issues.  
In 1987 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the FCC’s decision 
to eliminate the Fairness Doctrine.4  The court accepted the FCC’s 
argument that spectrum scarcity—the underlying rationale for fairness rules 
for the public and candidates—had been alleviated by growth in the 
number of diverse media outlets available to the public.5  The Commission 
also felt the Fairness Doctrine infringed broadcasters’ First Amendment 
rights.6  Ultimately the candidate rules were left intact and remain today. 
During the 2012 elections, television and radio audiences found 
themselves awash in the usual advertisements from political candidates and 
their supporters.  This time campaign spending was higher than ever 
before.  The Washington Post reported total spending by Barack Obama 
and Mitt Romney to be a record two billion dollars.7  The total cost of the 
2012 election season—including federal, state and local elections—was 
widely reported to be six billion dollars.8  However, media critics Bob 
McChesney and John Nichols argue the figure is actually closer to ten 
billion dollars.9  Whatever the actual figure, in the post-Citizens United10 
2. See FCC, REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246,
1247 (1949); FCC, HANDLING PUBLIC ISSUES UNDER THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 
5 (July 12, 1974); and Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
3. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) (2012) (“The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or
necessity will be served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any applicant 
therefore a station license provided for by this Act.”); see also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 
190, 216 (1943). 
4. See Telecomm. Research and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501, 507 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
5. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5054 (Aug. 4, 1987).
6. Id.
7. See 2012 Presidential Campaign Finance Explorer, WASHINGTON POST (Dec. 7, 2012),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/campaign-finance/?tid=rr_ mod. 
8. See Nick Confessore, Total Cost of Election Could Be $6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31,
2012), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/total-cost-of-election-could-be-6-billion/; 
Charles Mahtesian, 2012 Election Price Tag: $6 Billion, POLITICO (Aug. 2, 2012), 
http://www.politico.com/blogs/charlie-mahtesian/2012/08/election-price-tag-billion-130856.html; 
Jonathan D. Salant, Election Costs to Exceed $6 Billion in 2012, Research Group Says, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 31, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/2012-10-
31/election-costs-to-exceed-6-billion-in-2012-research-group-says.html. 
9. See JOHN NICHOLS & ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, DOLLAROCRACY: HOW THE MONEY 
AND MEDIA ELECTION COMPLEX IS DESTROYING AMERICA 38 (2013). 
10. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 335–36 (2010) (restrictions
on campaign expenditures by corporations and unions violate their First Amendment free speech 
rights). 
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world, political broadcast advertising will likely continue to increase. 
While campaign spending is at record levels, broadcast political advertising 
is not a new phenomenon. It has been a part of broadcasting since the early 
years of radio in the 1920s.11 
Federal law requires broadcasters to provide fair treatment to legally 
qualified candidates and virtually absolute access to candidates for federal 
office.12  Ensuring fairness and access for candidates, as well as discussion 
of public issues, was part of broadcast regulation from the inception of 
broadcasting itself.  From 1922 to 1925, Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover convened four National Radio Conferences where government and 
industry leaders collaborated on developing the first broadcast regulation.13  
Censorship and discrimination by broadcasters were among the issues 
discussed.14  Access and fairness also drove much of the congressional 
debate leading to passage of the 1927 Radio Act.15  
The 1934 Communications Act requires broadcasters to serve the 
public interest, convenience, and necessity as conditions of holding a 
broadcast license.16  Providing fairness and access for political expression 
has long been a fundamental part of serving the public interest.  Rules for 
political broadcasting are specifically spelled out in sections 31517 and 
11. See Lewis E. Weeks, The Radio Election of 1924, 8 J. OF BROAD. 233, 234–43 (1963);
LAWRENCE LICHTY & MALACHI TOPPING, AMERICAN BROADCASTING: A SOURCE BOOK ON 
THE HISTORY OF RADIO AND TELEVISION 446 (Hastings House 1975); Louise M. Benjamin, 
Broadcast Campaign Precedents from the 1924 Presidential Election, 31 J. OF BROAD. AND 
ELEC. MEDIA 449, 450 (1987). 
12. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. §§ 315, 312 (a)(7) (2012).
13. Hoover was in charge of broadcast regulation under the ineffective 1912 Radio Act.
The Act, which was aimed at point-to-point wireless telegraphy, gave little authority to the 
Secretary of Commerce.  It was passed before the emergence of commercial broadcasting in 
the1920s.  Radio Act of 1912, Pub. L. No. 264, § 1, 37 Stat. 302, 304 (1912). 
14. See Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, Proceedings of the Fourth National Radio
Conference and Recommendations for Regulation of Radio (Nov. 9–11, 1925), 
http://earlyradiohistory.us/1925conf.htm; C. M. Jansky, Jr., The Contribution of Herbert Hoover 
to Broadcasting, 1 J. OF BROAD. 241, 245 (1957); Donald G. Godfrey, The 1927 Radio Act: 
People and Politics, 4 JOURNALISM HISTORY 74, 75–78 (1977); Daniel E. Garvey, Secretary 
Hoover and the Quest for Broadcast Regulation, 3 JOURNALISM HISTORY 66–85 (1976); Joseph 
P. McKerns, Industry Skeptics and the Radio Act of 1927, 3 JOURNALISM HISTORY 128–136
(1976); Louise Benjamin, Working it Out Together: Radio Policy From Hoover to the Radio Act
of 1927, 42 J. BROAD. AND ELEC. MEDIA 221, 222–236 (1998); and Philip T. Rosen, THE 
MODERN STENTORS: RADIO BROADCASTERS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 94–95 (1980).
15. See 67 CONG. REC. 12503–04 (daily ed. July 1, 1926).  See also LOUISE M. BENJAMIN,
FREEDOM OF THE AIR AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS IN 
BROADCASTING TO 1935 32–54 (2001); STEVEN J. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE 
MEDIA 16–27 (1978); David H. Ostroff, Equal Time: Origins of Section 18 of the Radio Act of 
1927, 24 J. OF BROAD. 367–80 (1980). 
16. See § 307(a) (“The Commission, if public convenience, interest, or necessity will be
served thereby, subject to the limitations of this Act, shall grant to any applicant therefore a 
station license provided for by this Act.”).  See also NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). 
17. § 315(a) reads as follows:
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31218 of the 1934 Act and in its predecessor, section 18 of the 1927 Radio 
Act.19  Despite various modifications to the 1934 Act,20 the basic access 
and fairness rules for candidates spelled out in sections 315 and 312(a)(7) 
remain in force.  However, little remains of the increasingly disregarded 
flipside of the broadcast fairness coin—the general fairness rules that were 
intended to ensure fairness and access for noncandidate members of the 
public and for discussion of controversial public issues.  As previously 
noted, these rules were enforced as the Fairness Doctrine from 1949 to 
1987.21  In short, the primary rationale supporting both the candidate rules 
and the Fairness Doctrine was spectrum scarcity and the broadcast 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for 
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal 
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such 
broadcasting station: Provided, That such licensee shall have no power of 
censorship over the material broadcast under the provision of this section.  No 
obligation is hereby imposed under this subsection upon any licensee to allow 
the use of its station by any such candidate.  Appearance by a legally qualified 
candidate on any-- (1) bona fide newscast, (2) bona fide news interview, (3) 
bona fide news documentary (if the appearance of the candidate is incidental to 
the presentation of the subject or subjects covered by the news documentary), 
or (4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events (including but not limited 
to political conventions and activities incidental thereto), shall not be deemed 
to be use of a broadcasting station within the meaning of this subsection. 
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving broadcasters, 
in connection with the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news 
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news events, from the obligation 
imposed upon them under this Act to operate in the public interest and to 
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues 
of public importance. 
18. Section 312(a)(7) requires broadcasters to “allow reasonable access to or to permit
purchase of reasonable amounts of time for the use of a broadcasting station by a legally qualified 
candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy.” 
19. The Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 18, 44 Stat. 1162, 1170 (1927) reads as
follows: 
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a legally qualified candidate for 
any public office to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal 
opportunities to all other such candidates for that office in the use of such 
broadcasting station, and the licensing authority shall make rules and 
regulations to carry this provision into effect: Provided, That such licensee 
shall have no power of censorship over the material broadcast under the 
provisions of this paragraph.  No obligation is hereby imposed upon any 
licensee to allow the use of its station by any such candidate. 
20. See Cable Communications Act of 1984 § 601, 47 U.S.C. § 521 (2012); Cable
Television Consumer Protection Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (1992); and 
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996). 
21. See FCC, EDITORIALIZING BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1247 (1949); FCC,
HANDLING PUBLIC ISSUES UNDER THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (June 27, 1974); and 
Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
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spectrum as public property. Broadcasters had to serve the public interest 
and fairness was a significant component in accomplishing that mandate. 
The Federal Radio Commission (“FRC”) explained the public interest 
responsibility of broadcasters in 1929 as follows: “Broadcasting stations 
are licensed to serve the public and not for the purpose of furthering the 
private or selfish interests of groups of individuals.  The standard . . . 
means nothing if it does not mean this.”22  Former FCC Commissioner 
Michael Copps described the public interest responsibility of licensees in a 
2007 New York Times opinion article: 
America lets radio and TV broadcasters use public airwaves worth 
more than half a trillion dollars for free. In return, we require that 
broadcasters serve the public interest: devoting at least some 
airtime for worthy programs that inform voters, support local arts 
and culture and educate our children—in other words, that aspire to 
something beyond just minimizing costs and maximizing 
revenue.23 
Because the spectrum is a limited public resource, broadcasters who 
are granted the privilege of using it must serve the public interest and are 
subject to government regulation.24  An important part of that regulation 
has historically included political fairness rules.  Even before the formal 
Fairness Doctrine was in place,25 general fairness was expected as part of 
broadcasters’ public interest obligation.  As early as 1928, the FRC made 
this point clear.26  Nevertheless, the 1980s deregulation-minded FCC27 and 
22. Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929).
23. Michael J. Copps, The Price of Free Airwaves, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/02/opinion/02copps.html?pagewanted=all. 
24. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); see also Red Lion, 395 U.S. 367
(1969).  Broadcast scholar Walter Emery noted forty-four years ago that broadcasters have a duty 
to serve the public even if members of the public are unaware of the public nature of the 
electromagnetic spectrum: 
Many people seem unaware that the radio spectrum belongs to the public and 
no broadcaster, whether commercial or educational, acquires any ownership 
rights in the frequency which is assigned to him.  He receives a license . . . to 
use this publicly owned resource.  This license is subject to renewal if he can 
show that his station has operated in the public interest and not simply in terms 
of his private and personal interest.  Too many people think of radio and 
television stations as being owned in the same way as farm land, grocery or 
hardware stores. 
WALTER B. EMERY, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMS OF BROADCASTING: THEIR 
HISTORY, OPERATION AND CONTROL 13 (1969). 
25. See EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246, 1248–49 (1949).
26. See Federal Radio Commission, 1928 ANNUAL REPORT, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 166 (Aug.
28, 1928). 
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the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals28 said, due to growth in the number of 
diverse media outlets, the Fairness Doctrine was no longer needed.29  Since 
1987 general broadcast fairness requirements for non-candidates have not 
been enforced.30 
At a time when social/political protesters31—the Occupy and Tea Party 
movements for example—are influencing public opinion, debate and 
policy, it is important to examine the rationale for, and origin of, broadcast 
political fairness and access rules.  One is compelled to ask why fairness 
and access rules for candidates remain in force when such guarantees of 
access to the public airwaves for members of the public to discuss public 
issues are deemed no longer necessary.  This article traces the origins and 
development of the candidate fairness and access rules, and the general 
non-candidate fairness rules including the rise and fall of the Fairness 
Doctrine.  Ultimately this article argues that broadcast fairness rules should 
apply equally to candidates and members of the public.  The rationale for 
fairness cannot apply to one group and not the other.  If the spectrum 
scarcity and public interest rationale for candidate rules still exist, then that 
rationale also supports the need for general fairness rules—perhaps even a 
resurrected twenty-first century Fairness Doctrine.  Conversely, if media 
growth and the resulting market forces have eliminated the need for general 
fairness rules, then the need for candidate fairness and access rules must 
also be questioned. 
II. The Origin of Political Broadcast Fairness Rules
Broadcasting plays a unique and important role in democracy. It sits at 
the juncture between two well-established principles: Expression related to 
self-government is afforded the highest level of First Amendment 
protection, and broadcasters must serve the public interest as a condition of 
27. See INQUIRY INTO SECTION 73.1910 OF THE COMMISSION’S RULES AND REGULATIONS
CONCERNING THE GENERAL FAIRNESS OBLIGATIONS OF BROADCAST LICENSEES, 102 F.C.C. 2d 
143, 146, 148 (Aug. 7, 1985) (hereafter referred to as the “1985 FAIRNESS REPORT”). 
28. See Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
29. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 F.C.C. Rcd. 5043 (1987).
30. The personal attack rules and political editorial rules were formally eliminated in 2000.
See Radio-Television News Dirs. Assoc. v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269, 272 (D.C. Cir. 2000). 
31. See Occupy Movement (Occupy Wall Street), N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013), available at
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/organizations/o/occupy_ 
wall_street/index.html; Occupy movement, ACLU, http://www.aclu.org/blog/tag/occupy-
movement (last visited Oct. 16, 2013); OCCUPY WALL STREET, http://occupywallst.org (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2013); TEA PARTY, http://www.teaparty.org (last visited Oct. 16, 2013); Tea 
Party Movement, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2013), http://topics.nytimes.com/ 
top/reference/timestopics/subjects/ t/tea_party_movement/ index.html. 
2014] POLITICAL BROADCASTING FAIRNESS 33
being granted a license.32  The political fairness and access rules exist 
because broadcasters occupy a unique position.  These rules are the most 
specific and expansive form of government content regulation on 
broadcasting.33  As a result, they have traditionally been unpopular with 
many broadcasters.  One radio station manager characterized the political 
broadcasting regulations as “confusing” and “grossly unfair.”34  Like many 
other regulations of expression, these rules have been challenged and have 
evolved over decades.  These regulations have also frequently been upheld 
by the courts.35 
The philosophical basis for regulation of political broadcasting is the 
Jeffersonian proposition that the free flow of political news and 
information to citizens is a fundamental requirement for a viable 
democracy.36  In theory, the aim of access and fairness rules is to encourage 
maximum expression and discussion of diverse ideas—the traditional 
concept of a marketplace of ideas—via broadcasting.37   
Some critics have argued that, in reality, only the major parties and 
their wealthy and powerful supporters have access to the marketplace 
because regulators marginalize political ideas from outside the status quo.38  
32. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372, 374 (2010); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Boos v. Berry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 14 (1976); Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969). 
33. Broadcasters are also subject to content regulation of indecency and children’s
television, but the political fairness rules are more expansive and intrusive.  See FCC v. Pacifica, 
438 U.S. 726, 737–38 (1978) (upholding regulation of broadcast indecency); and Cruz v. Ferre, 
755 F. 2d 1415, 1420–23 (11th Cir. 1985) (distinguishing protected cable indecency from 
regulated broadcast indecency); see also Children’s Television Act of 1990,  47 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 
303(b), 394 (2012) (establishing mandatory programming and commercial limits). 
34. Elizabeth Krueger & Kimberly and Corrigan, Broadcasters’ Understanding of Political
Broadcast Regulation, 35 J. OF BROAD. 289, 300 (1991). 
35. See Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887, 892
(9th Cir. 1974); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 567 (1981); Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 
F.2d 417, 429–30 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Daniel Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 84–85 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
and Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 42-47 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
36. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 38–39 (1948); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–
9, (1970); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 34 (1920); RODNEY SMOLLA, FREE 
SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 6–17 (1992).  See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 
364 (1984); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S 397 (1989); and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1966), “speech 
concerning public affairs is more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government.” 
37. A 1991 study of eighty-three stations in the state of Washington concluded that, in
reality, many broadcasters (in all market sizes) did not understand the access rules.  § 312(a) (7) 
access for federal candidates, access for candidates’ supporters (“Zapple Doctrine”), and the 
personal attack rules proved to be particularly confusing.  One station manager claimed, “I don’t 
know a single broadcaster that fully understands political rules.  Most of us fly by the seat of our 
pants on these issues.”  Krueger and Corrigan, supra note 34. 
38. See ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, TELECOMMUNICATIONS, MASS MEDIA, AND
DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE FOR THE CONTROL OF U.S. BROADCASTING, 1928–1935 (1994). 
34 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [36:1
Others have argued that Congress enacted political broadcasting rules for 
selfish reasons: “Congress protects its own.”39  No matter how one views 
their motivation and performance, broadcast regulators over the decades 
have implemented and interpreted numerous content regulations based on 
the rationale that access and fairness in political broadcasting are necessary 
elements in protecting the public interest.  One commentator simply 
explained the rationale for regulation as follows: “Since broadcasters enjoy 
a government-granted monopoly to use a scarce public resource—the 
airwaves—they have certain responsibilities to the public, and should be 
prevented from exploiting their monopolies.”40 
Prior to 1927, political broadcasting was mostly uncharted territory 
with very little government control.  However, as radio’s power to shape 
public opinion emerged, politicians began to see the possibilities for abuse 
and unfairness.  In 1922, Republican Senator Harry New used U.S. Navy 
radio facilities to broadcast a campaign message from Washington to his 
constituents in Indiana.  After Democrats complained about New using 
government facilities for a partisan broadcast, the Navy began denying use 
of its facilities for political broadcasts.41  That same year Democrat William 
Jennings Bryan predicted that radio would be a great benefit to Democrats 
because “arrangements will be made for impartial treatment of 
candidates.”42  Major newspapers of the time, which tended to support 
Republicans, were under no obligation to treat candidates impartially. 
During the 1924 presidential campaign, charges of political censorship 
arose when Progressive Party candidate Robert La Follette was not allowed 
to speak on station WHO in Des Moines, a station owned by Republicans. 
An unnamed official from AT&T reportedly expressed reluctance to air 
broadcasts by Progressive candidates for fear of angering stockholders, and 
another broadcaster expressed fear of the economic consequences of letting 
a Socialist speak on his station.43  Radio commentator H. V. Kaltenborn 
made critical statements about Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes 
during a 1924 broadcast on AT&T’s WEAF station when the U.S. 
government refused to formally recognize the Bolshevik government of the 
USSR.  After Hughes complained to company officials, AT&T adopted a 
39. FORD ROWAN, BROADCAST FAIRNESS, DOCTRINE, PRACTICE, PROSPECTS: A 
REAPPRAISAL OF THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND EQUAL TIME RULE 35 (1984). 
40. Michael Pollan, Keeping Television Regulated, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1981,
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/12/22/opinion/keeping-television-regulated.html. 
41. See Ostroff, supra note 15, at 369.
42. Id.
43. See id. at 370–371.
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policy prohibiting broadcasts critical of the government or government 
officials.44 
After the Republicans held on to the White House, The New Republic 
concluded that because the majority of stations were owned by big industry 
and managed by conservatives (and Republicans had more money to 
spend), Republicans got more airtime than Democrats and “at least ten 
times as much as the Progressives.”45  Broadcast historian Louise Benjamin 
noted that while the Republicans did have more money than the Democrats 
and Progressives, they were also more savvy and made better use of 
radio—including requesting a radio-use guide from AT&T.46  General 
Electric had adopted a fairness policy during the campaign requiring its 
stations to present opposing views when broadcasting political speeches or 
other controversial subjects.47  The importance of broadcasting in politics 
became clear on election night 1924 when an estimated twenty million 
listeners tuned in to hear the results on more than four hundred stations.48 
The 1927 Radio Act was the first enacted legislation to specifically 
address political broadcasting.49  Section 18 guaranteed equal opportunities 
for opposing candidates with no censorship power for stations.50  Over the 
years the rules expanded to include an access right for federal candidates,51 
the Fairness Doctrine,52 editorial rules,53 equal opportunity for candidates’ 
supporters,54 and rules limiting rates charged for political advertisements.55  
These rules, both indirect and direct content regulations, were implemented 
in the name of the public interest.  Congress, the FRC, and the FCC 
believed broadcasters’ role of providing information was so vital to the 
proper functioning of a representative democracy, it justified such content 
regulation.56  Regulators largely held on to this view up to the 1980s when 
the Fairness Doctrine was eliminated.57 
44. See BENJAMIN, supra note 15, at 33–34.  Kaltenborn’s contract was not renewed despite
his popularity. 
45. Editorial, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov.19, 1924, at 284.
46. See BENJAMIN, supra note 15, at 44.
47. See BENJAMIN, supra note 15, at 46–47.
48. See Benjamin, supra note 11, at 456; see also Weeks, supra note 11, at 233–43.
49. Radio Act of 1927, U.S. Statutes at Large 44 (1927).
50. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (2012).
51. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (2012).
52. FCC, REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
53. Id.
54. Request by Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707 (1970).
55. 47 U.S.C. § 312.
56. See generally NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); and Red Lion Broad. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
57. See Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Syracuse Peace Council, 2
F.C.C. Rcd. 5057 (1987); and Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
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III. Fairness for Candidates
Section 18 of the 1927 Radio Act said licensees who allowed a legally 
qualified candidate to use their stations must afford equal opportunities to 
all other such candidates for that office.58  In addition, licensees were 
prohibited from censoring candidates’ messages.  Stations were not 
required to give access to candidates in the first place, but once they 
allowed a use by one, equal access for opponents was triggered.59  When 
the 1934 Communications Act supplanted the 1927 Act, section 18 carried 
over as section 315 of the new Act.  Legally qualified candidates were 
defined by the FCC as those who publicly announced their intentions to run 
were qualified by state or federal law to hold the office, had a place on the 
ballot (or a public write-in campaign), and were actively campaigning.60  In 
1950 in Felix v. Westinghouse Radio Stations, an appellate court ruled that 
candidates must personally appear and “use” a station—for equal access to 
be triggered.61  Appearances by candidates’ supporters or friends did not 
count as a candidate use.62 
A. No Censorship
The no censorship provision of section 18 was tested in 1932 when the
Nebraska Supreme Court said stations were responsible, along with 
candidates, for defamatory comments made during political broadcasts.63  
In 1958 the U.S. Supreme Court clarified the no censorship or station 
liability conflict when the Farmers Educational and Cooperative Union of 
America sued a North Dakota radio station after it aired a speech by a 
senatorial candidate.64  The candidate had accused the Union and his 
opponents of conspiring to establish a communist organization.65  The U.S. 
Supreme Court held that licensees could not censor candidates’ messages, 
and they were also protected from any liability for candidates’ defamatory 
statements.  
In a series of rulings starting in the 1970s the Commission interpreted 
the political rules to mean even extreme candidate speech cannot be 
censored.  In 1972 the FCC ruled that stations could not censor candidates’ 
political speech, even when it was highly inflammatory and caused threats 
of violence.  An Atlanta radio station reported receiving bomb threats after 
58. See Radio Act of 1927, supra note 49.
59. Id.
60. See FCC Broadcast Radio Services, 47 C.F.R. § 73 (1940).
61. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir.1950).
62. Id.
63. See Sorenson v. Wood, 243 N.W. 82 (1932).
64. See Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S. 525 (1959).
65. Id. at 526–27.
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airing a political announcement made by a white racist from Georgia who 
was a candidate for the U.S. Senate.  Among other things, the candidate 
said, “you cannot have law and order and niggers too.”66  The Mayor of 
Atlanta and a number of groups asked the FCC to rule that broadcasters 
should not have to air such announcements if they pose a public safety 
threat.  The Commission refused, noting that, in the absence of direct 
incitement of imminent lawless action, censorship of candidates’ remarks 
cannot be allowed.  It argued that if it allowed such censorship, anyone 
could block a candidate’s message merely by threatening violence.67  In 
1978, the Commission said the no censorship provision of section 315 
means even if words are thought to be indecent or obscene, candidates 
cannot be prohibited from using them in their political announcements.68  
During the 1980 presidential campaign the Citizens Party ran a radio 
commercial in which the word “bullshit” was repeated a number of times.69  
Echoing the 1972 ruling on racist political broadcasts, the FCC held such 
announcements cannot be censored unless the candidate creates a clear and 
present danger of riot or violence.70 
In 1996 the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals said channeling 
controversial political announcements to nighttime safe harbor hours is 
censorship in violation of section 315.71  In 1992, a legally qualified 
congressional candidate ran a television advertisement depicting aborted 
fetuses on an Atlanta station shortly before 8PM.72  The station received 
numerous viewer complaints.73  When the candidate asked to air a Sunday 
afternoon thirty-minute political program, containing similar graphic 
depictions, the station cited indecency rules and agreed to air the program 
only during late night safe harbor hours.74  During this time some anti-
abortion candidates were producing advertisements that showed “tiny 
66. Complaint by Atlanta NAACP, Atlanta, Ga., 36 F.C.C. 2d 635, 636 (1972).
67. Id. at 637.
68. See Complaint by Julian Bond, 69 F.C.C. 2d 943 (1978).
69. Complaint of Barry Commoner and LaDonna Harris against NBC Radio, 87 F.C.C. 2d
1, 2 (1980). 
70. Id. at 6.  Under the U.S. Supreme Court’s incitement standard, speech can only be
prohibited when it is directly inciting imminent lawless action that is likely to occur. 
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). 
71. Daniel Becker v. FCC, 95 F.3d 75, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1996).  Safe harbor hours are times
(currently 10 p.m. to 6 a.m.) when indecent material can be broadcast because children are not 
likely to be in the audience.  See also ACT v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
72. Becker, 95 F.3d at 76.
73. The FCC reportedly received approximately twelve hundred phone complaints and one
thousand letters.  Carol S. Lomicky & Charles B. Salestrom, Anti-Abortion Advertising and 
Access to the Airwaves: A Public Interest Doctrine Dilemma, 42 J. OF BROAD. AND ELEC. MEDIA 
491, 505 (1998). 
74. Becker, 95 F.3d at 77.
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dismembered body parts, partially formed faces and bloody uterine fluid.”75  
The FCC supported the station ruling in 1994 that limiting the 
advertisements to late-night hours protects children and does not violate the 
no-censorship provision of section 315.76  On appeal the D.C. Circuit sided 
with the candidate.77  The court argued that content-based channeling 
limited candidates’ ability to fully inform voters, and it inhibited full 
discussion of political issues.78  The candidate could not reach voters with 
his message as effectively during late night hours as he could on a Sunday 
afternoon.79 
B. Defining “Use”
Despite the 1951 Felix v. Westinghouse ruling that equal access was
only triggered when a candidate personally appeared on a station, there 
were no guidelines spelling out what kinds of appearances counted as 
uses.80  When the FCC ruled in 1959 that both political and non-political 
appearances by Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and his Republican 
opponent were uses triggering equal access for a third party candidate, 
Congress acted.81  Section 315(a), as amended in 1959, contains four use 
exemptions.  Appearances by candidates are not a use if they occur during: 
(1) a bona fide newscast, (2) a bona fide news interview, (3) a bona fide
news documentary (if the appearance is incidental to the primary program
subject), and (4) on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events.82
Application of the use exemptions has not been simple.  The FCC has 
defined use as any positive appearance by a candidate by voice or picture, 
not covered by one of the above exemptions.83  Nevertheless, numerous 
questions have arisen over the years involving definitions of news events, 
program formats, sponsorship and control of the programs, presidential 
news conferences, and non-political appearances.  Shortly after creating the 
use exemptions, Congress temporarily suspended section 315 in 1960 so 
stations could air the first-ever televised presidential debates between John 
Kennedy and Richard Nixon without triggering equal time for minor party 
75. Lomicky and Salestrom, supra note 73, at 493.
76. See Petition for Declaratory Ruling Concerning Section 312(a)(7) of the
Communications Act, 9 F.C.C. Rcd. 7638, 7649 (1994). 
77. Becker, 95 F.3d at 71.
78. Id. at 82.
79. Id. at 83.
80. 186 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1950).
81. See Petitions of CBS, Inc. and NBC, 26 F.C.C. 715 (1959).
82. See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (a) (2012).
83. Id. § 315.
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candidates.84  Four years later, the FCC created confusion when it said 
President Johnson’s press conferences were not covered by any of the use 
exemptions, and then seemed to reverse itself two weeks before the 
election when it said his speech (carried on the three networks) addressing 
events in the Soviet Union and China was exempt as a bona fide news 
event.85  In 1975 the Commission changed its position on press conferences 
by incumbents and candidates, ruling that broadcasts of such conferences 
are not uses, but rather, on-the-spot coverage of bona fide news events.86  
However, broadcasts of press conferences are not considered bona fide 
news interviews because they are not regularly scheduled nor controlled by 
broadcasters.87  In 1980 the FCC said even when incumbents used press 
conferences to attack political opponents, such broadcasts are exempt as 
on-the-spot news as long as broadcasters are exercising bona fide news 
judgment.88 
In 1972 the D.C. Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals reversed an 
earlier FCC decision89 when it ruled that a broadcast of Face the Nation, 
featuring leading Democratic presidential candidates Hubert Humphrey and 
George McGovern, did not qualify for exemption as a bona fide news 
interview.90  The network had expanded the show from its regular half-hour 
to a full hour, prompting a third-party candidate to ask for time on CBS, 
which she was eventually granted.  News interview and discussion shows, 
such as Meet the Press, Good Morning America, and The View are 
generally treated as bona fide news interview exemptions as long as the 
program is regularly scheduled, the program is controlled by the 
broadcasters, and format, guests, and content decisions are based on 
broadcasters’ journalistic judgments rather than political considerations.91  
Televised debates are now considered bona fide news events, but prior 
to 1984, a third party—not the candidates or broadcasters—had to sponsor 
the debate.  As noted above, Congress made a special exception to section 
315 in 1960 so the presidential debates could be televised.92  In 1975, just 
in time for the 1976 presidential election, the FCC ruled that third-party-
sponsored debates were covered by the on-the-spot coverage of bona fide 
84. ALAN SCHROEDER, THE PRESIDENTIAL DEBATES: FIFTY YEARS OF HIGH RISK TV 16–
17 (2d ed. 2008). 
85. See Inquiry Concerning “Equal Time” Requirements under Section 315 of the
Communications Act of 1934 as Amended, 40 F.C.C. 3953 (1964). 
86. See Petitions of Aspen Inst. and CBS, Inc., 55 F.C.C. 2d 697 (1975).
87. Id. at 711.
88. See Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
89. See Hon. Sam Yorty and Hon. Shirley Chisholm, 35 F.C.C. 2d 572 (1971).
90. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
91. See Request by CBS Inc. for Declaratory Ruling, 2 FCC Rcd. 4377 (1987).
92. See Chisholm v. FCC, 538 F.2d 349.
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news events exemption.93  As a result, the League of Women Voters 
organized televised presidential debates in 1976 and 1980.94  The 
Commission expanded the debate exemption in 1983 to include debates 
sponsored by broadcasters.95  It reasoned that the identity of a debate 
sponsor had no bearing on the newsworthiness of the event.96  The League 
of Women Voters challenged the policy change citing fears of broadcasters 
showing favoritism to some candidates.97  The court of appeals upheld the 
policy change.98  The FCC ultimately extended the on-the-spot bona fide 
news exemption to include debates sponsored by the candidates themselves 
as long as broadcasters controlled amount and type of coverage,99 and even 
to a one-hour program featuring back-to-back half-hour presentations by 
opposing candidates.100 
C. NonPolitical Appearances
Not all broadcast appearances by candidates are “political.”  Since the
political successes in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s of President Reagan, a 
former actor, it has become more common for celebrities to run for public 
office.  The 2003 campaign of California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger is a good example of the complexity of interpreting the 
nature of appearances by celebrity candidates.  Controversial radio host 
Howard Stern was advised to cancel an interview with Schwarzenegger 
because of equal opportunity questions surrounding the 130 plus candidates 
in the 2003 California recall election; however, the FCC ultimately ruled 
that interview segments of Stern’s “shock jock” show qualified as a bona 
fide news interview.101  Former Senator and Law and Order actor Fred 
Thompson mounted a presidential campaign in 2008,102 and satirist writer 
Al Franken won a seat in the U.S. Senate.103  By definition, celebrities are 
people who frequently appear in mass media.  When celebrities are also 
candidates, such appearances raise complicated use questions. 
93. Id.
94. See League of Women Voters Educ. Fund v. FCC, 731 F.2d 995 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
affirming Petitions of Geller, 95 F.C.C. 2d 1236 (1983). 
95. Geller, 95 F.C.C. 2d at 1245.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1241.
98. See generally League of Women Voters, 731 F.2d 995.
99. See Request for Declaratory Ruling by WCVB-TV, 2 FCC Rcd. 4778 (1987).
100. See Request of King Broad. Co., 6 FCC Rcd. 4998 (1991).
101. See Request of Infinity Broad. Operations, Inc. for a Declaratory Ruling, 18 FCC Rcd.
18603 (2003). 
102. John Harwood, Fred Thompson Hoping Chaos Brings Political Order, FREE REPUBLIC
(Sept. 1, 2007), http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/1889826/posts. 
103. The ‘Absentee’ Senator, WALL ST. J. (July 2, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/
news/articles/ SB124640687950076679. 
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In 1972, celebrity comedian Pat Paulsen challenged section 315 as an 
unconstitutional abridgment of his due process and equal protection 
rights.104  He argued that it was unfair that he had to give up his 
entertainment career in order to run for public office.105  Both the FCC and 
the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Paulsen, noting that equal 
opportunity rules were necessary to ensure fair use of broadcasting by 
candidates.106  In 1976 the FCC said if television stations aired old Ronald 
Reagan movies, it would be a use, and they would have to offer equal 
opportunities to his opponents.107   
In 1985 a television journalist wanting to run for public office said 
equal time should not be triggered every time he appeared on television as 
part of his job.108  He argued that his work appearances were not uses 
because he appeared on bona fide newscasts.109  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals disagreed and held that the events the reporter covered were 
newsworthy, but there was nothing newsworthy about the fact the reporter 
was covering such events.110  The court also said section 315 did not 
prohibit the reporter from running for office.111  He was just required to 
make sacrifices—his station told him he must take a leave of absence—as 
many candidates frequently must do.112 
The Commission reversed its “Reagan” nonpolitical appearance ruling 
in 1992 when it said appearances, such as broadcasting old movies 
featuring candidates, are only uses if the presentation is sponsored or 
controlled by the candidate.113  Just two years later, the FCC reversed its 
previous reversal, ruling that any positive appearance not covered by one of 
the bona fide news exemptions is a use, regardless of who is responsible for 
its airing.114  Presumably, under this interpretation, even radio broadcasts of 
songs by singers who may happen to be running for office would qualify as 
uses triggering equal opportunity. 
104. Paulsen v. FCC, 491 F.2d 887 (9th Cir. 1974).
105. Id. at 891–92.
106. Id. at 892.
107. Request by Adrian Weiss, 58 F.C.C. 2d 342, 343–44 (1976).
108. Branch v. FCC, 824 F.2d 37, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
109. Id. at 41.
110. Id. at 45.
111. Id. at 48.
112. Id. at 39.
113. See Codification of the Commn’s Political Programming Policies, 7 FCC Rcd. 4611
(1992). 
114. See Political Programming Policies, 9 FCC Rcd. 551, 651–52 (1994).
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D. Expanding Access
In 1971 Congress expanded political access when it added section
312(a)(7)115 to the Communications Act, giving federal candidates a right 
to reasonable access.  Stations cannot refuse to sell airtime to candidates for 
federal office unless they can demonstrate a very good reason for doing so. 
Although unlikely, a station could refuse to run ads for candidates for non-
federal political offices without providing a reason.  If stations do not 
provide “reasonable access” to federal candidates, their licenses can be 
revoked.  Broadcasters are not required to give any candidates free airtime, 
but they cannot shut them out by overcharging them either.  Section 315 (b) 
requires all candidates be given stations’ lowest advertising rates during the 
forty-five days before primaries and sixty days leading up to general 
elections.116  Together, sections 315 and 312 require broadcasters to sell 
advertisements to federal candidates and provide equal access opportunity 
to all candidates, without censorship, no matter what the candidate says or 
depicts, and they have to offer their best advertisement rates. 
During the 1980 presidential campaign the television networks 
challenged the reasonable access provision of section 312.  President Carter 
had asked to buy thirty-minute time slots for a campaign program to air 
December 1979.117  The networks argued that it was too early to air 
political programs when the election was not until November 1980.118  The 
U.S. Supreme Court said broadcasters do not decide when a campaign 
starts; federal candidates have an “affirmative, promptly enforceable right 
of reasonable access.”119  During the campaign Senator Ted Kennedy, a 
candidate for the Democratic nomination, responded to a broadcast of a 
thirty-minute Carter speech on economics by demanding thirty minutes of 
free airtime.120  Kennedy argued he was entitled to the time under section 
312 because the Carter broadcast occurred just four days before the New 
Hampshire primary.121  The D.C. Circuit held that Kennedy was entitled to 
an opportunity to respond, but broadcasters could charge for the time.122  
There was no obligation to give Kennedy free airtime.123  
In the 1980s and 1990s the FCC ruled that Political Action Committees 
(“PACs”) do not have section 312(a)(7) access rights,124 and broadcasters 
115. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2002).
116. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(b).
117. CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 414 (1981).
118. Id. at 393.
119. Id. at 377.
120. Kennedy for President Comm. v. FCC, 636 F.2d 417, 420–21 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
121. Id. at 430.
122. Id. at 432.
123. Id.
124. See Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 89 F.C.C. 2d 626 (1982).
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only have to offer candidates the same lengths of program times they sold 
to commercial advertisers within the previous year.125  In 1996, third-party 
presidential candidate Ross Perot filed a section 312 complaint when the 
networks refused to sell him all eight of the half-hour prime-time slots he 
requested.126  The Commission sided with broadcasters noting they had not 
denied Perot access.127  Rather, they had attempted to balance Perot’s needs 
with other legitimate concerns when they only sold him part of the time he 
requested.128  
In 1970 the FCC extended equal opportunity access to supporters of 
candidates.  Section 315 provides equal access when candidates themselves 
appear in a nonexempt use, but under the Zapple Doctrine,129 equal 
opportunity for supporters is triggered when supporters of an opposing 
candidate appear on his or her behalf.  The doctrine only applies during 
campaigns, and even then, stations do not necessarily have to give 
supporters free time.  As with section 315, bona fide news appearances by 
supporters do not trigger Zapple access. 
Since the Radio Act of 1927was enacted, government regulators have 
gone to great lengths to provide fair candidate access with no censorship. 
Section 18 was transplanted into the 1934 Communications Act as section 
315.130  A candidate use triggered access for opponents and stations were 
legally protected from liability for candidates’ comments.  The 
commitment to free speech was tested and upheld when the FCC and the 
courts protected controversial political broadcasts from censorship.  From 
the 1960s through the 1990s, regulators attempted to define “use” and bona 
fide news exemptions to encourage dissemination of political information. 
The section 312 and section 315 limits on advertising rates ensured access 
for federal candidates and reasonable advertising costs.131  It is difficult to 
imagine how Congress, the courts, and the FCC could have done more to 
ensure maximum access and fairness for political candidates. 
IV. Fairness for Noncandidates and Public Issues
Fairness and access for discussion of political issues has been one of 
the cornerstones of broadcasting regulation going back to Hoover’s 
National Radio Conferences of 1922-1925132 and the debate leading to the 
125. See Nat’l Ass’n of Broad., 9 FCC Rcd. 5778 (1994).
126. Complaint of Ross Perot, 11 FCC Rcd. 13109 (1996).
127. Id. at 13121–24.
128. Id. at 13119.
129. See Request by Nicholas Zapple, 23 F.C.C. 2d 707 (1970).
130. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2012).
131. Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (2012).
132. President Coolidge told delegates at the third radio conference in 1924 that increased
government authority would help ensure against powerful organizations controlling the airwaves. 
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1927 Radio Act.133  The 1924 presidential campaign provided an 
opportunity for experiments with network broadcasting.  Stations in 
widespread cities were connected to carry both party conventions, and the 
candidates gave a number of radio addresses, which were broadcast 
simultaneously on stations throughout the country.134  The unwavering 
commitment by broadcast regulators to protect candidates’ free speech is 
evident in the candidate rules discussed above.   
However, fairness in the discussion of public issues by citizens who are 
not candidates was also an important part of broadcast regulation from the 
1920s to the 1980s.  In a March 16, 1924, statement to the New York 
World, Secretary of Commerce Hoover argued that the radio bill being 
debated in Congress would “enable us to keep the ether open to 
everybody.”135  Hoover had expressed a similar view earlier that month. 
Testifying before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 
Hoover had said: 
We cannot allow any single person or group to place themselves in 
position where they can censor the material which shall be 
broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that the Government 
should ever be placed in the position of censoring this material.136  
Fairness in political broadcasting was an important issue for many of 
the legislators grappling with the bills that would eventually lead to the 
1927 Radio Act.  Representative Ewin Davis feared that broadcasters had 
already formed a powerful monopoly and were using their stations for 
selfish purposes not in the public interest.137  He advocated regulating radio 
as a public utility to ensure fairness: 
We are going to have to regulate the rates and the service, to force 
them to give equal service and equal treatment to all.  As it stands 
now they are absolutely the arbiters of the air . . . They can permit 
the proponents of a measure to be heard and can refuse to grant the 
See Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, Proceedings of the Third National Radio 
Conference (October 6–10, 1924) (transcript available in the Herbert Hoover Presidential Library, 
commerce papers, box 496). 
133. See BENJAMIN, supra note 15, at 32–54; see also SIMMONS, supra note 15.
134. See Weeks, supra note 11, at 233–43.
135. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, The Government's Duty is to Keep the Ether
Open and Free to All, N.Y. WORLD (Mar. 16, 1924) (transcript available in the Herbert Hoover 
Presidential Library, Bible, No. 364). 
136. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, To Regulate Radio Communication, and for
Other Purposes: Statement by Secretary Hoover at Hearings Before the Committee on the 
Merchant Marine and Fisheries on H.R. 7357 (Mar. 11, 1924) (transcript available in the Herbert 
Hoover Presidential Library, commerce papers, box 489). 
137. 67 CONG. REC. 5483 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1926).
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opposition a hearing.  They can charge one man an exorbitant price 
and permit another man to broadcast free or at a nominal price. 
There is absolutely no restriction whatever upon the arbitrary 
methods that can be employed and witnesses have appeared before 
our committee and already have given instances of arbitrary and 
tyrannical action in this respect, although the radio industry is now 
only in its infancy.138  
Davis also cited committee testimony in which an AT&T executive had 
testified that his company had rejected “a great many” requests to use its 
stations and “edited” speakers’ statements as a matter of policy.139 
Senator Robert Howell argued that it was a matter of tremendous 
importance to include a fairness provision that would ensure equal 
treatment of candidates and extend to discussion of public issues.  “I cannot 
emphasize this too strongly.”140  Howell was also concerned with private 
censorship being exercised by broadcasters.  “Are we content to the 
building up of a great publicity vehicle and allow it to be controlled by a 
few men, and empower those few men to determine what the public shall 
hear?”141  Senators Thomas Heflin and James Watson also expressed 
concern about keeping radio free from domination by a few wealthy station 
owners who would use it to unduly shape opinion on public issues. Heflin 
warned, “We ought not to let anyone have a monopoly of the air.”142 
V. Fairness and the Public Interest
General fairness in overall programming was a part of broadcasters’ 
public interest mandate.  Throughout much of the twentieth century, under 
the Fairness Doctrine, broadcasters were guided by a set of rules designed 
to ensure that controversial issues of public importance and personal 
attacks were dealt with fairly.  The origins of the Fairness Doctrine go back 
to the 1940s, but as previously noted, the issue of fairness in the discussion 
of politics and public issues emerged in the early years of radio in 
the1920s.143 
A. Informal Fairness Requirements
In the years before there was a formal Fairness Doctrine, the FRC
expected fairness in the discussion of public and political issues as part of 
138. Id.
139. Id. at 5484.
140. Id. at 12504.
141. Id. at 12503.
142. Id. at 12357.
143. Supra Part IV.
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broadcasters’ general duty to serve the public interest.  In its 1928 Annual 
Report, the Commission said a New York Socialist party station must show 
“due regard for the opinions of others.”144  In 1929 the FRC told the 
Chicago Federation of Labor that its station should appeal to the general 
public and serve the public interest, rather than just benefiting narrow 
group or class interests.145  That same year, in what came to be known as 
the Great Lakes statement,146 the FRC said allowing one-sided 
presentations of political issues would not be good service to the public, 
and public interest required ample free and fair competition of opposing 
views.  The Commission also noted that such fairness applied not only to 
candidates, but also to “all discussions of issues of importance to the 
public.”147  
Congress attempted to formalize broadcast fairness in 1932 when it 
passed an amendment adding the following language to section 18 of the 
Radio Act: “It shall be deemed in the public interest for a licensee, so far as 
possible, to permit equal opportunity for the presentation of both sides of 
public questions.”148  President Hoover pocket-vetoed the amendment in 
1933, along with other lame-duck legislation passed by the Democrat-
controlled Congress.149  Although this might seem counter to Hoover’s 
staunch support and years of work protecting the public interest in 
broadcasting, it may be that the failing economy in 1933 and his 
contentious relationship with the Democrat-controlled Congress led him to 
use the veto somewhat indiscriminately.150 
The following comments, made by Representative Harold McGugin 
during discussion of the equal opportunity amendment in February 1932, 
illustrate how passionate he felt about protecting free public discussion 
from censorship imposed by private broadcasters: 
144. Federal Radio Commission, 1928 ANNUAL REPORT, 2 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 155 (Aug. 28,
1928). 
145. See Chicago Fed’n of Labor, 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 36 (1929).
146. See Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929).
147. Id.
148. H.R. REP. NO. 72-2106, at 4 (1933).
149. 76 CONG. REC. 5787 (daily ed. Mar. 3, 1933).
150. See generally HARRIS GAYLORD WARREN AND HERBERT CLARK HOOVER, HERBERT 
HOOVER AND THE GREAT DEPRESSION 151 (1980) (chronicling Hoover’s difficulties with the 
Democratic-controlled lame duck Congress); HERBERT HOOVER, THE MEMOIRS OF HERBERT 
HOOVER: THE CABINET AND THE PRESIDENCY, 1920–1933 217 (1952) (Hoover believed 
Democrats, and some older members of his own party in Congress, were sabotaging his efforts to 
deal with the Depression.  He wrote in his memoirs that during his final two years as president the 
Democratic Congress was “bent on the ruin of the administration,” and he accused “older 
Republican elements of the party in Congress” of “surreptitious encouragement to the opposition 
and refusal to “defend the administration.”). 
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I believe we are considering something that strikes at the very roots 
of government itself . . . In this modern age there is no freedom of 
speech worthy of the name unless there is reasonable freedom of 
access to radio. The right and privilege to stand on the street corner 
and talk no longer fills the bill . . . With the coming of radio we 
have virtually seen air of the country monopolized and turned over 
to the largest stations, such as the one that my friend from New 
York has just described; but, my friends that wonderful station . . . 
which belongs to General Electric, will never use its facilities to 
appeal for the rights of the people of this country.  The facilities of 
that station will be used to spread propaganda to lull the people to 
sleep while monopoly or concentrated greed takes unfair advantage 
of the country. The hope of freedom of speech is going to rest back 
in the little, free, independent radio stations in the country.151 
Nevertheless, the amendment was not added to section 18 when it 
became section 315 of the 1934 Communications Act.152  Senator Clarence 
Dill, coauthor of the 1927 and 1934 Acts, believed the FRC already had 
authority to require equal opportunity for fair discussion of public issues 
without adding a specific amendment.153 
In 1938, the FCC reinforced its position that broad programming for 
the general public best served the public interest, rather than narrow 
propaganda supported by licensees.  The Commission denied a license 
application from a fundamentalist religious group that indicated it would 
only air programming that supported its beliefs.154  In its 1940 Annual 
Report, the FCC said broadcasters could decide which specific groups or 
individuals to allow on their stations, but serving the public interest meant 
furnishing “well-rounded rather than one-sided discussions of public 
questions.”155  
In 1941, in what came to be known as the Mayflower statement, the 
FCC laid the foundation for what would become the Fairness Doctrine.156  
The Commission warned that a station in Boston must stop broadcasting 
editorials because “truly free radio cannot be used to advocate the causes of 
the licensee.”157  The Commission said the public interest requires licensees 
to provide full and equal opportunity for presentation of all sides of public 
151. 75 CONG. REC. 3692 (daily ed. Feb. 10, 1932).
152. See 78 CONG. REC. 10988 (daily ed. June 9, 1934).
153. See H.R. REP. NO. 7716 (1933).
154. See Young People’s Ass’n for the Propagation of Gospel, 6 F.C.C. 178 (1938).
155. 6 FCC Ann. Rep. 55 (1940).
156. See Mayflower Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1940).
157. Id. at 340.
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issues.  “The public interest—not the private—is paramount.”158  Many 
misinterpreted the decision as an outright ban on editorials.159 
In 1945 the Commission clarified its 1929 Great Lakes160 Statement 
and broadcasters’ obligation to present important public issues.  The FCC 
said it is “the duty of each licensee to be sensitive to the problems of public 
concern in the community and to make sufficient time available, on a 
nondiscriminatory basis, for full discussion thereof.”161  The Commission 
also explained that it would not require balance in individual programs. 
Rather, it would look at fairness in stations’ overall programming.  The 
FCC’s 1946 Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees (the 
“Blue Book”) suggested program guidelines for broadcasters to follow to 
ensure they served the public interest.162  It emphasized the affirmative duty 
of broadcasters to present controversial public issues.163  Broadcasters who 
attempted to avoid problems by avoiding controversial community issues 
were not serving the public interest.164  
B. Formalizing Fairness
The 1949 Report on Editorializing by Broadcasting Licensees
concluded that licensees could express their views in editorials.165  
However, such editorials were to be just one part of the larger duty to 
devote reasonable time to differing views.  The Report also established the 
Fairness Doctrine as an FCC policy.166  Broadcasters were required to 
present controversial issues of public importance and allow reasonable 
opportunity for opposing views.167  The FCC said a reasonableness 
standard would be used for judging stations’ compliance—there could be 
158. Id.
159. See STEVEN J. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE MEDIA 41 (1978).  “The
National Association of Broadcasters, local stations, labor groups, and individual citizens 
opposed the supposed ban on editorializing as an invasion of free speech, and there were demands 
from all quarters for clarification of exactly what the Mayflower decision meant.”  Commissioner 
Robert F. Jones contended the Mayflower Doctrine “fully and completely” prohibited licensees 
from speaking “in behalf of any cause.”  See Report on Editorializing by Broadcast Licensees, 13 
F.C.C. 1246, 1259 (1949).
160. See Great Lakes Broad. Co., 3 F.R.C. Ann. Rep. 32 (1929).
161. United Broad. Co., 10 F.C.C. 517 (1945).
162. See FCC, Public Service Responsibility of Broadcast Licensees March 7, 1946,
DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN BROADCASTING 151, 152 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 1973). 
163. Id.
164. In 1976 the FCC reprimanded a West Virginia radio station for refusing to air
programming on strip mining even though it was an important controversial community issue. 
The station itself had cited development of new industry, and air and water pollution as issues 
important to its listeners.  See Rep. Patsy Mink, 59 F.C.C. 2d 987 (1976). 
165. 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1249.
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no strict formula.  Going beyond section 315 and section 312 access and 
fairness rules, which applied to candidates only, the Fairness Doctrine 
extended fairness and access to noncandidate members of the public for the 
discussion of any issues of public importance.  Broadcasters were required 
to play a “conscious and positive role” in presenting opposing views, and 
make their facilities “available for the expression of the contrasting views 
of all responsible elements in the community on the various issues which 
arise.”168 
In 1959 Congress appeared to codify the Fairness Doctrine as part of 
section 315 of the Communications Act.169  Section 315 (a) (4) on-the-spot 
news exemption contained the following passage: 
Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be construed as relieving 
broadcasters, in connection with the presentation of newscasts, 
news interviews, news documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of 
news events, from the obligation imposed upon them under this 
chapter to operate in the public interest and to afford reasonable 
opportunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of 
public importance.170 
The FCC explained in a 1963 letter to Congressman Oren Harris that 
the Fairness Doctrine had become a “specific statutory obligation.”171  This 
1959 amendment seemingly elevated the doctrine from an FCC policy to 
statutory law. 
In 1964, the FCC issued a Fairness Primer which reminded 
broadcasters that they were free to editorialize as long as they complied 
with the Fairness Doctrine.172  It included summaries and explanations of 
more than ten years of FCC fairness rulings and a section on personal 
attacks.173  The Commission issued formal rules on personal attacks and 
political editorials in 1967.174  The personal attack rule required 
broadcasters to notify and offer a reasonable response time within one 
week to non-candidates or groups who were attacked during presentations 
of controversial issues of public importance.175  Section 315 already 
168. Id. at 1248–50.
169. 47 U.S.C. § 315(a)(4) (2002).
170. Id.
171. Letter to Oren Harris, 40 F.C.C. 582, 583 (1963).
172. See Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of Controversial Issues of
Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10415 (July 25, 1964). 
173. Id.
174. See FCC, REPORT AND ORDER ON THE PERSONAL ATTACK RULES, 32 Fed. Reg. 10303,
10305 (July 12, 1967). 
175. Id.
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provided response opportunities for candidates who were attacked by their 
opponents.  The political editorial rules required licensees who endorsed or 
opposed candidates in editorials to notify the candidates and offer a 
reasonable opportunity for them or their representatives to respond.  The 
Commission stressed that political editorials and personal attacks were not 
prohibited, but stations must comply with the notification and response 
requirements.176 
The Fairness Doctrine was challenged by a Pennsylvania radio station 
and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1969 in Red Lion Broadcasting v. 
FCC.177  The station, owned by Red Lion, aired a Christian Crusade 
broadcast in 1964 that included a personal attack on author Fred J. Cook. 
Reverend Billy James Hargis claimed that Cook, who wrote a book titled 
Barry Goldwater—Extremist of the Right, had worked for a Communist 
publication and was attempting to smear Barry Goldwater. Red Lion denied 
Cook’s request for time to reply.178  He complained to the FCC, which told 
Red Lion it must give Cook reply time under its Fairness Doctrine 
obligations.179  Red Lion appealed, arguing the doctrine and its personal 
attack rules were not authorized by Congress and furthermore violated the 
First Amendment.180  The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that because 
of spectrum scarcity, the personal attack rules and the Fairness Doctrine did 
not violate the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.181  Where there are 
substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are 
frequencies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment 
right to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, 
write, or publish.182  
The Court stressed the First Amendment rights of the viewing and 
listening public over the rights of the broadcasters: 
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the 
Government from requiring a licensee to share his frequency with 
others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with 
obligations to present those views and voices which are 
representative of his community and which would otherwise, by 
necessity, be barred from the airwaves.183 
176. Id. at 10303. See also, SIMMONS, supra note 15 at 76–77.
177. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389 (1969).
178. FRED J. COOK, BARRY GOLDWATER – EXTREMIST OF THE RIGHT (1964).




183. Id. at 390.
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The Court also said that the Fairness Doctrine and the personal attack 
and political editorializing rules were a legitimate exercise of 
congressionally delegated authority.184  The personal attack and editorial 
rules were later codified as federal statutory law in 1976.185 
The FCC issued another Fairness Report in 1974.186  Echoing the 1949 
Editorializing report,187 it reminded broadcasters of their duty to air 
controversial issues of public importance and allow opportunity for 
opposing views.  The Commission said that providing fairness was “the 
single most important requirement of operation in the public interest—the 
sine qua non for grant of a renewal of license.”188  The report also 
explained that the FCC would not actively monitor stations for fairness 
violations.  Rather, it would rely on citizen complaints; specifically, only 
complaints containing clear evidence of violation would be forwarded to 
stations.  The FCC noted that only ninety-four of twenty-four hundred 
complaints it received in 1973 were forwarded to stations for their 
comments.  The report explained that in order to determine when an issue 
was an important public issue, stations should measure the degree of 
attention paid to an issue by government officials, community leaders, and 
the media. 
The Fairness Doctrine was unpopular with many broadcasters and 
some scholars. In addition to First Amendment challenges, such as the ones 
put forth in Red Lion, critics have argued that the Fairness Doctrine was 
excessively vague and impossible to fairly enforce.189  Others argued that 
politicians and supporters used it as a tool to intimidate and manipulate 
stations into not airing opposing programs.190  The deregulation 
philosophy191 of the Reagan-era FCC of the 1980s further encouraged 
attacks by the opponents of the Fairness Doctrine. 
184. Id. at 386.
185. See C.F.R. §§ 73.123, 73.300, 73.598, 73.679 (1976).
186. See FCC, 1974 FAIRNESS REPORT, 48 F.C.C. 2d 1 (1974).
187. See REPORT ON EDITORIALIZING BY BROADCAST LICENSEES, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949).
188. 1974 Fairness Report, supra note 186, at 10, quoting Comm. for the Fair Broad. of
Controversial Issues, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C. 2d 283 (1970). 
189. See THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A. POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST
PROGRAMMING 240 (1994).  The authors, who advocate strong newspaper-style First Amendment 
rights for broadcasters, concluded the following: “We believe that, notwithstanding those rather 
impressive credentials as a symbol of virtuous aspirations, the Fairness Doctrine will not and 
cannot work.” 
190. See ROWAN, supra note 39, at 189; see also LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN 
BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 142–61 (University of California Press 1987). 
191. FCC Chairman Mark Fowler (1981–1987) observed in a 1981 magazine interview that
television is just another appliance, and characterized it as nothing more than “a toaster with 
pictures.”  See Voices of Reason, REASON MAGAZINE (Dec. 1, 1998), http://reason.com/ 
archives/1998/12/01/voices-of-reason/4.  See also Peter J. Boyer, Under Fowler, F.C.C. Treated 
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C. The Demise of the Fairness Doctrine
In 1985, the FCC issued another Fairness Report.192  A decade after
calling the Fairness Doctrine indispensable—the sine qua non for license 
renewal—the FCC now said it was obsolete.  The Commission noted that 
the increased number of broadcast stations and cable channels in the years 
since Red Lion (a more than 40% increase in the number of radio and 
television stations)193 had produced sufficient viewpoint diversity to ensure 
fairness.  The “multiplicity of voices in the marketplace”194 would naturally 
produce fairness.  Nevertheless, the FCC did not immediately repeal the 
Fairness Doctrine.   
Confusion remained about whether the Doctrine was codified as part of 
section 315 or merely an FCC policy.  However, following a 1986 opinion 
from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the FCC eliminated Fairness 
Doctrine requirements in 1987.195  In TRAC v. FCC, the court held that, 
despite the language of the 1959 amendment to section 315, the Fairness 
Doctrine was not mandated by the Communications Act.196  The 1959 
amendment only ratified “the Commission’s long-standing position that the 
public interest standard authorizes the fairness doctrine.”197  The Fairness 
Doctrine was an FCC policy, which the FCC could eliminate if it 
determined it no longer served the public interest.198  The D.C. Circuit 
upheld the FCC decision to eliminate the doctrine. The court agreed that it 
chilled speech and was unnecessary.199  
The 1967 personal attack and editorial rules—providing response 
opportunities for individuals attacked during a broadcast, or opponents of 
candidates endorsed by stations—remained, but they too were eliminated in 
2000 after the FCC failed to provide the D.C. Circuit with a public interest 
rationale for them.200  The court ordered the Commission to repeal both the 
personal attack and political editorial rules.201  Though the Fairness 
Doctrine was not enforced after 1987, it was not formally eliminated until 
2011. On August 22 of that year FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski 
TV as Commerce, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/01/19/ arts/under-
fowler-fcc-treated-tv-as-commerce.html. 
192. See 1985 FAIRNESS REPORT, supra note 27.
193. See id. at 202.
194. Id. at 147.
195. Television News Dirs. Ass’n. (“TRAC”) v. FCC, 801 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
196. Id.
197. Id. at 517–518.
198. Id. at 518.
199. Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
200. See Radio-Television News Directors Ass’n v. FCC, 229 F.3d 269 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
201. Id.
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announced the elimination of “eighty-three outdated and obsolete media-
related rules, including Fairness Doctrine regulations.”202 
As the twenty-first century began, section 312 and section 315 access 
for candidates and Zapple access for candidate supporters remained, but the 
Fairness Doctrine and its key corollaries were deemed to no longer serve 
the public interest.  Strong protections have ensured candidate access and 
fairness over the past decades.  Candidates and their supporters today enjoy 
equal opportunity access with no censorship, and federal candidates have a 
near absolute right of access with guaranteed minimum advertising rates. 
Noncandidate members of the public, on the other hand, have not fared as 
well.  
For nearly forty years, the Fairness Doctrine was in place for the 
benefit of citizens to encourage fair and open discussion of important 
public issues.  However, the growth of mass media, along with a 
“television-is-a-toaster”203 deregulation philosophy and a reinterpretation of 
section 315 (a)(4), led to the doctrine’s demise in the 1980s.  The explosive 
growth of conservative talk radio in the 1980s and 1990s led to calls from 
some progressives for resurrection of the Fairness Doctrine.204  
Nevertheless, the FCC has not attempted to reestablish the doctrine and 
attempts by Congress have been vetoed or died from lack of support.205 
VI. Discussion: Equality for Everyone
As noted above, the traditional rationale for broadcast fairness and 
access rules has been spectrum scarcity and the public nature of the 
202. FCC, FCC Chairman Genachowski Continues Regulatory Reform to Ease Burden on
Businesses; Announces Elimination of 83 Outdated Rules, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS 
COMMISSION WEBSITE (Aug. 22, 2011), http://www.fcc.gov/document/ genachowski-announces-
elimination-83-outdated-media-rules.  See also, FCC Axes Fairness Doctrine, Other Old Media 
Regulations, FIRST AMENDMENT CENTER (Aug. 23, 2011) http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
fcc-axes-fairness-doctrine-other-old-media-regulations. 
203. See 67 CONG. REC. 5483 (daily ed. Mar. 12, 1926).
204. A study by the Center for American Progress concluded that by 2007 (twenty years after
the FCC stopped enforcing the Fairness Doctrine), 91% of the total weekday talk radio 
programming on the 257 news/talk radio stations owned by the top five commercial station 
owners was conservative.  Nine percent was classified as progressive.  See The Structural 
Imbalance of Political Talk Radio, CENTER FOR AMERICAN PROGRESS & FREE PRESS (June 21, 
2007), http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/ issues/2007/06/pdf/talk_radio.pdf. 
205. In 1987 both the House and Senate passed a bill to restore the Fairness Doctrine only to
have it vetoed by President Reagan.  See Nat Hentoff, Policing the First Amendment, FIRST 
AMENDMENT CENTER (Jan. 31, 2007), available at http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
policing-the-first-amendment.  Similar bills failed in 1993 and 2007.  See Jim Puzzanghera, 
Fairness Doctrine Debate Ignites Heated Discussion, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, July 30, 2007, 
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-07-30/ business/0707290144_1_fairness-doctrine-controv 
ersial-issues-kmet-fm-in-los-angeles. 
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spectrum.206  The electromagnetic spectrum is a finite, publically owned 
resource.  As such it is subject to government regulation.  Those who enjoy 
the broadcast privilege must follow public interest regulations, including 
the political rules.  When the Fairness Doctrine was eliminated in 1987, the 
FCC and the Court of Appeals cited growth in the number and diversity of 
media outlets, and First Amendment concerns, as the key reasons it was no 
longer needed.  If one accepts this rationale for eliminating the Fairness 
Doctrine, one must then question how this rationale can support the 
continued existence of the candidate access and fairness rules.  Are the 
section 315 and section 312 candidate rules still needed?  In order to 
address that question it is necessary to briefly revisit key points of the 
FCC’s Report and its reasons for eliminating the Fairness Doctrine. 
A. Rationale for Eliminating the Fairness Doctrine
Citing its 1985 Report, in 1987 in Syracuse Peace Council,207 the FCC
said spectrum scarcity was no longer a relevant issue due to the growth of 
diverse sources of information and viewpoints in the years since Red Lion 
was decided.  It noted that in 1987 there were 1,315 televisions stations 
(54% increase) and 10,128 radio stations (57% increase).208  The 
Commission concluded that spectrum scarcity was no different from limits 
on newsprint and ink, or any other scarce limited resources.209  The 
Commission also pointed to the growth of cable and satellite 
communication to justify its argument that “government regulation such as 
the fairness doctrine is not necessary to ensure that the public has access to 
the marketplace of ideas.”210 
The FCC also argued that the Fairness Doctrine led to inappropriate 
government intrusion on the editorial discretion of broadcast journalists 
requiring regulators to “second guess” their decisions211  In short, the 1987 
FCC concluded the Fairness Doctrine was an unnecessary burden on 
broadcasters that infringed their First Amendment rights.  It was no longer 
part of serving the public interest—the sine qua non of a license renewal.  
B. Applying the Rationale to the Candidate Rules
There were more media outlets in 1985 than there were when Red Lion
was decided in 1969.  With the growth in cable and satellite 
206. See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943), and Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367. 
207. See Syracuse Peace Council, 2 FCC Rcd. 5043, 5054 (Aug. 4, 1987).
208. See id. at 5051.
209. See id. at 5055.
210. Id. at 5051.
211. Id. at 5051–52.
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communication, and the Internet, there are obviously many more media 
voices in 2013.  Even with the rapid ownership consolidation212 following 
passage of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,213 there are vastly more 
media choices available than in 1969.  Following the reasoning of the 1985 
Fairness Report, individual broadcast stations no longer need to cover 
public issues and present opposing views because the sheer number of 
diverse media outlets ensure fairness in the larger “information 
marketplace.”214  Members of the public should naturally receive diverse 
viewpoints on controversial public issues from the numerous media sources 
available to them.  The further expansion of media since the 1980s, social 
media most recently, has put even more information at the public’s 
fingertips.  Opponents of the Fairness Doctrine would likely argue that 
citizen activists or individuals attempting to build public support for a 
cause or issue have no need for Fairness Doctrine-type access to broadcast 
stations when they have these twenty-first century media outlets at their 
disposal.  However, political candidates and their staffs have access to 
these same new media.  Why do they still need sections 315 and 312 access 
and fairness protection? 
If candidate A makes a claim on his or her website or Facebook page, 
or during a paid advertisement—broadcast or otherwise—candidate B can 
counter that claim through a wide range of media without needing to 
invoke the broadcast access/fairness rules.  As the 1985 Report explained, 
the information marketplace ensures fairness.  If desirability of the Fairness 
Doctrine must be considered in the context of the twenty-first century 
information marketplace, why are the candidate rules stuck in decades long 
past?  The language of section 315 comes from the 1920s and section 312 
access was created in 1971.  
One might argue that, despite the numerous information sources 
available today, many people still rely on local over-the-air broadcast 
stations for news and other information.  Former FCC commissioner 
Michael Copps noted that as recently as 2007, “Nearly 60% of adults watch 
local TV news each day—it remains the nation’s most popular information 
source.”215  The FCC’s public service campaign216 to educate viewers about 
212. Between 1996 and 2002 the number of U.S. commercial radio stations increased 5.4%
while the number of station owners decreased 34%.  See George Williams, Review of the Radio 
Industry, 2007, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WEBSITE (2007) at 5, 
http://www.fcc.gov/ownership/studies.html.  One observer noted, “[o]utlet diversity should not be 
presumed to guarantee viewpoint diversity in a highly concentrated industry in which profit 
drives the content chosen,” Ann L. Plamondon, Proposed Changes in Media Ownership Rules, 25 
COMM. & L. 47, 93 (2003). 
213. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996).
214. Supra note 27.
215. Michael J. Copps, supra note 23.
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the 2009 transition of over-the-air television from analog to digital also 
illustrates the value the government still places on free broadcast television 
and its important role in keeping citizens informed.  In light of this, logic 
suggests that the candidate broadcast fairness rules are still needed to keep 
citizens informed.  However, this line of reasoning also strongly supports 
requiring stations to make a good faith effort to inform those same citizens 
by presenting important public issues with opportunities for opposing 
views—a Fairness Doctrine.  If the U.S. information marketplace has 
outgrown Fairness Doctrine rules then it has also outgrown the section 315 
and section 312 candidate rules.  
One might also argue that broadcast media are different from satellite, 
Internet and print media in that they utilize the finite public broadcast 
spectrum and are subject to licensing and tighter regulation, such as the 
candidate rules.  After all, this is the foundation for the public interest 
standard and all U.S. broadcast regulation.217  But again, this same 
argument supports enforcing Fairness Doctrine rules. 
The FCC also argued the Fairness Doctrine violated the First 
Amendment and infringed on broadcast journalists editorial discretion.218  
Broadcasters do have First Amendment rights,219 but not to the same extent 
as print media, cable or the Internet.220 
Nevertheless, in the 1985 Fairness Report the Commission was 
concerned with protecting the rights of broadcasters to control the content 
of their stations, even suggesting broadcast speech be elevated to the same 
First Amendment standard enjoyed by print media.221  The Commission 
frequently used the term “broadcast journalists” when referring to 
broadcasters’ right to be free from “intrusive government regulation.”222  
While there can be no simple definition of journalism, it is likely the 
Commission’s conception of broadcast journalism in 1985 was 
significantly different from the reality of the entertainment-driven 
216. See Digital Television, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION WEBSITE,
www.fcc.gov/digital-television (last visited Aug. 5, 2013). 
217. See NBC v. United States, supra note 3, Red Lion Broad. v. FCC, supra note 2, and
FCC v. Pacifica, supra note 33. 
218. Supra note 5, at 5051–52.
219. See Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1948).
220. See Near v. State of Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (prior restraints on
print media are presumed to be unconstitutional); Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241 (1974) (right-of-reply law violated First Amendment rights of newspaper); Cruz v. Ferre, 
supra note 33 (cable television has more First Amendment protection than broadcast); Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (internet indecency restrictions in the Communications Decency 
Act, 47 U.S.C. § 223, violate the First Amendment). 
221. See 1985 Fairness Report, supra note 27, at 155.
222. Id. at 148.
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television programming223 and the emotionally charged political talk radio 
broadcasting prevalent in 2013. 
The Commission characterized the Fairness Doctrine as, “a regulation 
which directly affects the content of speech,” and “significantly impairs the 
journalistic freedom of broadcasters.”224  In short, the 1985 Report argued 
the Fairness Doctrine infringed broadcasters’ editorial discretion and First 
Amendment rights because it required them to present controversial public 
issues and provide reasonable opportunities for opposing views. 
Conversely, the FCC and the courts have said it is in the public interest and 
not an infringement of broadcasters’ editorial discretion and First 
Amendment rights to force them to air candidates’ political ads containing 
racial slurs225 and images of aborted fetuses226 as required under section 
315 and section 312 candidate rules.  Enforcing the Fairness Doctrine was 
infringing broadcasters’ rights but requiring them to repeatedly broadcast 
outrageous candidate messages is not.  The inconsistency is staggering. 
VII. Conclusion
In eliminating the Fairness Doctrine broadcast regulators abandoned a 
fundamental public interest principle that had been in place for five 
decades.  One would expect that such a dramatic shift would be driven by 
significant change in the underlying rationale.  The Commission cited the 
changing media landscape—more media outlets and diversity—and First 
Amendment concerns as its key justifications.  However, as noted 
frequently in this article, those justifications for eliminating the Fairness 
Doctrine equally justify eliminating the candidate fairness rules.  The 
public interest contradiction is obvious. 
As of 2013 the section 315 and section 312 candidate fairness rules 
remain in place.  As political spending continues to increase to record 
levels,227 it is likely the public will see and hear more and more messages 
from candidates broadcast over the public’s airwaves.  Political candidates 
for federal, state, or local office should be on the same First Amendment 
footing as members of the general public—no more or no less. This could 
be achieved two ways.  First, Congress—with input from the FCC and 
broadcasters—could draft and enact a new Fairness Doctrine that clearly 
223. For an account of the origins of the decline of network television journalism in the
1980s, see JOE FOOTE, LIVE FROM THE TRENCHES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE TELEVISION 
NEWS CORRESPONDENT (1998). 
224. 1985 Fairness Report supra note 27, at 156.
225. Complaint by Atlanta NAACP, Atlanta, GA, supra note 66.
226. See Daniel Becker v. FCC, supra note 35.
227. See supra note 7.
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establishes the doctrine as statutory law and that also takes into account the 
media landscape as it exists in 2013 and with an eye to the future.  Or 
second, Congress could simply eliminate section 315 and section 312 
candidate fairness rules using the same justifications used to eliminate the 
Fairness Doctrine in 1987. 
It is past time for broadcast regulators to recognize the hypocrisy and 
act. Intellectual honesty and the public interest demand it. 
